In this seminar, philosopher Adam Etinson (St. Andrews) will discuss what human rights are for and what makes them different from other kinds of rights. Specifically, given that human rights law is quite ambitious (or “maximalist”), why is human rights theory so unerringly conservative (or “minimalist”)? This seminar in the Philosophy and Human Rights-series is co-organised by Human Rights Studies and the Department of Philosophy, with support from Erik & Gurli Hultengrens fond för filosofi.

Philosophers often claim that human rights are minimalistic standards, concerned only with “avoiding the terrible rather than achieving the best.” (Nickel 2007: 36). But this claim fits poorly with the maximalism of human rights law, which contains many norms of high ambition. How can we explain this divergence between theory and practice? And can it be justified?

To get a copy of the paper to read in advance, send an email to the contact person. The paper is forthcoming in Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Human Rights, eds. Jesse Tomalty & Kerri Woods. 

Adam Etinson is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews. His publications include, Human Rights: Moral or Political? (Oxford University Press, 2018), and “What’s So Special about Human Dignity?” in Philosophy & Public Affairs (2020). Read more about Adam here.

All are welcome!